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THE FATE OF "NO-FAULT" IN 
AMERICA 
Richard Gaskins* 
Outside New Zealand other countries debated possible "no-fault" reforms.  Why did other 
countries not follow the same pattern as New Zealand in the 1960s?  This article looks at the 
different policy outcomes in the United States, where no-fault proposals of limited scale were 
vigorously debated in the 1960s, and where more comprehensive approaches (including ideas 
drawn from the New Zealand ACC) struggled to gain political traction amidst the growing trend to 
litigation in the 1970s.  Also taking shape in the United States was a new conceptual approach to 
the problems of personal injury, using the language and methods of welfare economics, which 
utterly transformed the academic debate.  The writings of Guido Calabresi may suggest how, after 
1980, the core definitions and distinctive principles advanced by Woodhouse seemed lost in 
translation, especially after these American methods found their way into New Zealand ACC 
debates. 
HEW Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice:1 
It may yet come to pass that the most effective remedies for the ills of our tort reparation system will be 
disclosed by demonstration, in an attractive, usually tranquil, and very civilized little country half-a-
world away from the troubled industrial societies with which it shares a common legal heritage … The 
developments "down under" thus merit our most careful and continuing observation. 
  
* Brandeis University (Massachusetts, USA). I am pleased to acknowledge support from Fulbright New 
Zealand and the US Fulbright Commission for my research on comparative compensation policies. My 
gratitude also goes to the Law Faculty at Victoria University of Wellington for hosting my visit as a 
Fulbright Scholar in 1999, and on other occasions. In particular, Geoff McLay has been a generous and 
stimulating colleague. A Fulbright Senior Specialist award made it possible for me to participate in the 2002 
conference for which this paper was written. It should be added that several key Fulbright exchanges in the 
early days of New Zealand ACC played a role in acquainting Americans with the scheme and its history. 
1  Arthur H Bernstein "'No-Fault' Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand" in United States 
Department Health, Education, and Welfare Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice 
(1973) Supplementary Volume 848. Bernstein visited New Zealand and conducted personal interviews in 
November 1971. 
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I A DOG THAT NEVER BARKED 
Whenever New Zealanders look back at their unique system of accident compensation, critics of 
the ACC scheme like to pose a simple question: if the original concept was so marvelous, why has 
no other country chosen to follow New Zealand's example of comprehensive no-fault?  Throughout 
the 1970s, it was with pride that New Zealanders shared their compensation experiment with 
international visitors.  By the 1990s, however, the tide had shifted, and defenders of the earlier 
vision found themselves on the defensive.  Eventually they encounter that nagging question, what 
did other countries know that New Zealanders did not?  Was there some compelling bit of evidence 
or theory that pointed others in more promising directions?  This line of questioning counts as 
powerful rhetoric in contemporary policy debates.  It also invites a historical response: taking us 
back to the 1960s, when the pendulum seemed to be swinging in the no-fault direction in most 
developed English-speaking countries.2 
Outside New Zealand there were specific political and economic events that blocked the 
momentum toward no-fault during the 1960s and 1970s—often frustrating international reformers 
who regarded ACC with admiration.  During this same period there also emerged—chiefly in the 
United States—an intellectual counter-movement to no-fault, confined at first to a body of 
professional literature based on innovations in welfare economics.  It was not until about 1980 that 
these new ideas gained wide favor, by which time the political pendulum had turned away from no-
fault solutions.  History can help us understand these elusive turning points in the policy process—
the results of multiple and countervailing forces.  This essay looks back at the "curious incident" of 
no-fault deliberations that went nowhere.3 
Entering the 1960's Americans were exploring no-fault ideas in much the same spirit as other 
outposts of common law culture.4  But the debate in America followed distinctive patterns and 
produced unique outcomes, in starkest contrast to the comprehensive no-fault policy proposed in 
  
2  Throughout this paper I follow the convention of referring to the New Zealand scheme as "ACC", despite its 
frequent name changes over time. For a history of the scheme and its amendments through the mid-1990s, 
see Ian B Campbell Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Its Rise and Fall (Auckland, 
Auckland University Press, 1996). This paper also refers to the 1967 Royal Commission Report that made 
the case for comprehensive reform. See Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, Wellington, 1967) known as the "Woodhouse Report" 
after its chairman, Sir Owen Woodhouse. 
3  The term "no-fault" is regrettably imprecise. It may refer variously to liability rules (for example liability 
without fault) or to entitlement to compensation (for example, first-party insurance), or both. Despite the 
breadth of the term, it was widely used in America and New Zealand, among other places, into the 1970s. It 
has obvious inadequacies as short-hand for the central philosophy behind ACC. My colleague William 
Vosburgh points out that "no-fault" was also popularly applied to contemporary reforms of American 
divorce laws. 
4  For a summary of American contributions in comparative context, and with abundant references to the 
literature, see Alexander Szakats Compensation for Road Accidents (Sweet & Maxwell, Wellington, 1968). 
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1967 in New Zealand.  Specific reasons for these differences can be found in American political 
culture, especially its standard rhetoric of rugged individualism, along with a cumbersome 
legislative process that confines policy changes—if any—to the margins of social problems.5  
Beyond these familiar political features there are more arresting and powerful elements in the no-
fault debate that need to be rescued from historical amnesia.  By understanding these distinctive 
American contributions (and by locating them in historical time), other nations may recognise 
political and ideological trends that have spread to other systems.  In comparative perspective, what 
emerges from this history is the contrast of two sharply distinct ways of framing the whole 
compensation problem, each embedded in a particular social vision. 
The fate of no-fault in America is a complex tale with many possible interpretations.6  Focusing 
on the 1960s, I want to review several broad tensions that may explain why we ultimately resisted 
New Zealand-style reforms.  It took about 10 to 20 years for American practice to move away from 
anything approaching the New Zealand model.  In retrospect, the key transitions include: (1) shifts 
in national economic priorities, understood as finding a new balance between social equity and 
economic efficiency; (2) shifts in political vision, with an eroding confidence in legislation and 
residual choice for market autonomy; and (3) shifts in academic styles, which would eventually 
replace traditional no-fault discourse with the new policy vocabulary of welfare economics.  By 
1980, these changes—working together—were sufficient to block the earlier momentum for no-
fault, making it difficult for us to remember now what the earlier debate was all about.  Americans 
today scratch their heads when they hear about the New Zealand scheme, whose implementation at 
home has been shadowed by similar ideological doubts.  The fate of no-fault in America previews 
familiar controversies that would eventually surface in New Zealand. 
  
5  The no-fault debate seriously tested the boundaries of residual individualism, as was pointed out by 
Theodore J Lowi "The Welfare State: Ethical Foundations and Constitutional Remedies" [1986] Political 
Science Quarterly 101, 197.  Lowi's analysis is a useful corrective to Robert Kagan's recent argument that 
American constitutional values promote "adversarial legalism" (Adversarial Legalism: The American Way 
of Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2001)). 
6  This is an appropriate place to acknowledge my appreciation to three colleagues whose interest in New 
Zealand (facilitated by Fulbright awards) proved contagious. Jane C Kronick, Miriam Vosburgh, and 
William W Vosburgh (along with others, myself included) received two research grants in the 1970s from 
the United States National Science Foundation to explore the political, economic, sociological, and legal 
origins of ACC, with comparative analysis of contemporary debates in the United States. See Jane C 
Kronick (ed) New Zealand Accident Compensation: Community Responsibility as a Value Response to 
Technological Development (National Science Foundation, Wellington, 1978) and Value Issues in the 
Control of Technology-Related Damage (National Science Foundation, Wellington, 1980) [Grants Nos 
0SS76-14797 and 0SS78-18023].  Along with Geoffrey Palmer's work (see, for example, Geoffrey Palmer 
Compensation for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford 
University Press, Wellington, 1979)) reports from Kronick's group remain the most detailed studies of ACC 
policy formation. 
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My main task here is to investigate what undermined the no-fault debate in America.  Two 
additional parts of the story will be mentioned briefly along the way: (1) the chaotic, cyclical growth 
of personal injury litigation in America, caused arguably by energy that might have been 
rechanneled into no-fault legislation; and (2) new public perceptions of risk and responsibility that 
emerged in the 1970s wave of environmental regulation, and that remain in constant tension with 
our current policies on compensation and prevention. 
A Social Priorities and the Role of Government 
During the first days of the Kennedy administration, back in the early 1960s, many Americans 
were still asking how government could best contribute to the general welfare.  Common discourse 
on the "accident problem" implied there were concrete solutions—even bold solutions, by our 
standards—that could be engineered and maintained by political authorities.7  In this respect, 
Americans caught up in "no-fault" debates shared common political assumptions with the rest of the 
developed world.  As the spotlight fell on highly visible losses of accident victims, especially in 
automobile accidents, it revealed the wasteful traditional methods of filtering compensation through 
judicial fault doctrines.8 
In broad political terms, the decade began with a call to public action by President Kennedy, 
who had campaigned against the "do-nothing" Eisenhower era.  This passive image of government 
was often ridiculed by the dynamic captains of Kennedy's administration.  His chief economic 
advisor, Walter Heller, declared that ideas from the likes of Chicago economist Milton Friedman 
would paralyze government action.  Rather than "getting the country moving again," Friedman's 
reactionary counsel would stop government in its tracks.  Friedman's mantra, as Heller later wrote, 
reversed common sense: "Don't do something, just stand there".9  By contrast, it was strength and 
vigor that defined the Kennedy image, and vigorous action was still projected onto State institutions 
and their charismatic leaders. 
  
7  The modal example of this standpoint is Robert E Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell Basic Protection for the 
Accident Victim—A Blueprint for Reforming Automobile Insurance (Little Brown, Boston, 1965). A version 
of this proposal also appeared in (1965) 78 Harv L Rev 329. Another influential work that remained 
skeptical about reform was Walter J Blum and Harry Kalven Jr Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law 
Problem—Auto Compensation Plans (Little Brown, Boston, 1965). 
8  Prior to Keeton/O'Connell, several studies had documented the plight of victims and various inadequacies of 
tort remedies. For example, Marc A Franklin, Robert H Canin and Irving Mark "Accidents, Money, and the 
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation" (1961) 61 Colum L Rev 1; Alfred F Conard 
Automobile Accident Costs and Payments: Studies in the Economics of Injury Reparation (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1964). Another version was published as "The Economic Treatment of 
Automobile Injuries" (1964) 63 Mich L Rev 279.  
9  Milton Friedman and Walter W Heller Monetary v Fiscal Policy (Norton, New York, 1969) 34. The 
occasion was a 1968 debate staged at the Graduate School of Business Administration at New York 
University. 
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And yet, there was less to this muscular statesmanship than the rhetoric suggests.  In contrast to 
state planning in time of war, American leaders found few points of political leverage in the cyclical 
economic expansion of the post-war era.10  Distrustful of social welfare systems modeled in 
Western Europe, American politicos in the early 1960s passed over the question of how economic 
gains should be fairly distributed.  Increasing national economic wealth was an end in itself during 
the Cold War era, and distributional fairness (always difficult for Americans to define with any 
precision) could be left to the invisible hand of markets.  For other countries at this time, questions 
of social equity were more central: a fair distribution of wealth and income was considered the 
prerequisite condition for economic efficiency and growth.11  By contrast, the right-leaning 
Keynesian advisors to Democratic governments came to argue that equality and efficiency were 
caught in a massive "trade-off", requiring governments to locate an awkward equilibrium between 
competing social and economic ideals.12    
The Kennedy administration buried distributional concerns in the course of internal debates on 
economic policy.  Having recognised the need for fiscal stimulus, the redoubtable Walter Heller 
wanted to take it in the form of corporate tax cuts to fuel investment.  He ultimately prevailed over 
John Kenneth Galbraith, who had argued for social investment in public goods, including both 
physical infrastructure and social safety nets.13  In retrospect, Heller's vision of economic policy 
resembled Milton Friedman's retreat from politics more than anyone realised: it scaled down 
expectations for broad social reform, and called instead for fine-tuning the largely automatic settings 
of a market economy.  The American preference for hidden-hand solutions was inexorably 
reasserting itself during this decade.  Social equity lost its force as a goal of social policy; it became 
a brake on economic markets, distracting them from fulfilling their autonomous functions.  To be 
sure, race relations and President Johnson's War on Poverty remained part of the equity debate.  
Except in the courts, however, many Americans concluded that greater equality came at the expense 
of order and efficiency.    
B 1960s: Zeroing in on Automobiles  
This studied avoidance of distributional fairness shaped the original discussion of personal 
injury issues, lowering the stakes in the search for no-fault legislation.  By the mid-1960s, attention 
remained focused on automobile accidents, where social equity between established interest groups 
  
10  On this trend generally see Gary Marks "The Revival of Laissez-Faire" in Richard Hodder-Williams and 
James Ceaser (eds) Politics In Britain and the United States: Comparative Perspectives (Duke University 
Press, Durham, 1986) chap 2. 
11  Richard Titmuss was a representative figure. See Brian Abel-Smith and Kay Titmuss (eds) The Philosophy 
of Welfare (Allen & Unwin, London, 1987). 
12  Arthur M Okun Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-Off (Brookings, Washington DC, 1975). 
13  See Bruce Miroff Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F Kennedy (David McKay, New 
York, 1976) 170, 204-28. 
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played a modest role.  By contrast, there had been elements of class conflict between employers and 
employees back when America adopted workers' compensation—the pioneer no-fault scheme found 
in most American states by around 1920.  In the classless post-war universe of automobile drivers 
and road accident victims, it was harder to frame the issues of equity.  Rather than rescuing some 
disadvantaged class, no-fault automobile plans redefined fairness at more abstract levels.  The main 
problems were these: accident victims (in the aggregate) received inconsistent treatment in the 
judicial process, administrative costs of individualised proceedings were high, and private insurance 
made largely irrelevant the judicial inquiry into personal fault.  These problems do not compel any 
special concern for the welfare of individual victims.  Over time, social equity became less 
important than the efficient use of collective resources.  Nonetheless, empirical studies continued to 
document the impact of this imperfect system on individual accident victims and their families.14 
While the United States produced no manifestos with anything approaching the scope of 
Canadian Terence Ison's 1967 study,15 there was a flood of academic proposals for correcting the 
deficiencies of road accident compensation.16 Drawing on ideas consolidated in the 1930s at 
Columbia University,17 these proposals commanded an impressive range of variables and solutions.  
  
14 This position was particularly strong in the influential study by Leon Green Traffic Victims: Tort Law and 
Insurance (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1958). 
15  Terence G Ison The Forensic Lottery (Staples Press, London, 1967).  
16  The nearest exception is Marc A Franklin "Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective 
Reimbursement" (1967) 53 Virginia L Rev 774. The leap beyond existing categories of accidents was not 
especially bold, given the widely critical perspective on traditional negligence concepts. See, for example, 
Albert Ehrenzweig Negligence Without Fault: Trends Toward an Enterprise Liability for Insurable Loss 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1951). Two essays worked out some implications of extending 
workers' compensation to other types of injuries: Roger C Henderson "Should Workmen's Compensation Be 
Extended to Non-Occupational Injuries?" (1969) 48 Tex L Rev 117; Merton C Bernstein "The Need for 
Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Compensation" (1971) 119 U Pa L Rev 992. Americans also like to 
point to a 1913 article that advocated expansion of workers' compensation: Jeremiah Smith "Sequel to 
Workmen's Compensation" (1913) 27 Harv L Rev 235. Jeffrey O'Connell first ventured into this wider 
territory in 1973, basing his extensions on voluntary contractual agreements: Jeffrey O'Connell "Expanding 
No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance" (1973) 59 Virginia L Rev 749, but his writings managed to remain 
painstakingly incremental. One does not find a comprehensive vision until Eli Bernzweig's 1980 book: Eli 
Bernzweig By Accident Not Design: The Case for Comprehensive Injury Reparations (Praeger, New York, 
1980). The major American contributors to the automobile debate were certainly aware of broad "social 
insurance" alternatives to tort but failed to consider them creatively, whether for reasons of intellectual 
timidity, political prudence, or plain worry about where the money would come from. Commentators like 
Harry Kalven were wary of shifting private economic power to the public sphere (Harry Kalven "A Schema 
of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort System" (1968) 1 Connecticut L Rev 40); and others 
pointed to the mid-1960s debate over nationalised health insurance for the elderly, as well as controversies 
over the War on Poverty, as proof that Americans were not interested in constructing a broader safety net.  
17  See essays reprinted in "Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium" (1932) 32 Colum L Rev 
785. See also Fleming James Jr "The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An 
Unanswered Challenge" (1959) 59 Colum L Rev 408. Alan Clayton has reminded me that the American 
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Most 1960s planners envisioned some new insurance product that was sheltered, up to a point, from 
the costly procedures and moralistic rhetoric of tort law.  Under legislative ground-rules, private 
insurers would take over the compensation process, with minimal intervention from the common 
law system.  To bring the full financial impact of car accidents into the insurance calculus, some 
kind of compulsory framework had to be mandated by legislation.  Social problems would be solved 
when the market provided cheap and reliable insurance for all victims, with limits on costly judicial 
inquiries into individualised fault.  Looking back, the sheer number of accident protection plans 
adopting this formula may have exceeded the "57 varieties" touted by one of the leading food 
marketers of the decade.18  One is hard pressed to follow all the details: it was rather a nuanced 
exercise for full-time planners.  So far the American discussion still bears a family resemblance to 
what took place in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere, at least on the level of 
automobile accidents.19  It was lively enough at the level of academic brainstorming but grew more 
diffuse at State political levels, where special interest groups managed to weaken the reformist 
spirit. 
In such a climate, by 1966 or so, one might wonder whether ideas from Woodhouse or Ison 
could have pushed Americans to think in more comprehensive terms.20  But our debate evolved 
quite differently during the later half of the 1960's with the emergence of two new categories of 
personal injury claims: product liability and (to a lesser extent) medical malpractice.  By the end of 
                                                                                                                                                                
literature on automobile liability was active and creative in the period before 1932, and needs to be studied 
more carefully. 
18  Jeffrey O'Connell became an industry in himself, while the subtleties of his serial plans quickly exceeded 
the blunt realities of American politics. By making such programmes "elective" in nature, O'Connell and 
others anticipated the turn to consumer sovereignty that marked the decline of political initiatives. For a 
compilation, see Jeffrey O'Connell and Roger Henderson Tort Law, No-Fault and Beyond (Matthew 
Bender, New York, 1975).   
19  In another field that drew only mild interest in the United States, the concept of no-fault entitlement was 
applied to victims of crime. See, for example, Paul F Rothstein "How the Uniform Crime Victims 
Reparation Act Works" (1974) 60 American Bar Association J 1531. 
20 Ison's book was barely noticed in the American journals. An exception was Norman Penney ("The Forensic 
Lottery: A Critique on Tort Liability as a System of Personal Injury Compensation" (1971) 84 Harv L Rev 
761) who saw Ison's work as a challenge to the emerging conceptual model of Calabresi. Penney notes at 
765 with regret that "no one [that is no American] took [Ison's book] seriously". To hear about the 
Woodhouse Commission, Americans would have had to follow journals from the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, Australia, or Canada. See, for example, D L Mathieson "Royal Commission of Inquiry: 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand" (1968) 31 MLR 544, 549 which indicated that "the 
philosophy of the Report may be exportable". Peter McKenzie published a note on the 1969 White Paper: 
"Reports on Committees" (1971) 34 MLR 542. A reference to the 1963 New Zealand Report of the 
Committee on Absolute Liability (chaired by Richard Wild) shows up in a 1968 article by William Vickrey 
"Automobile Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An Economist's Critique" (1968) 33 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 473. But it was not until Geoffrey Palmer's series of articles in the early 1970s 
that reliable information came to American publications. 
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the decade, any comprehensive no-fault agenda would have needed to include a new range of 
interest groups—consumers and producers, patients and health providers.  These groups were 
quickly developing adverse interests, shaped by a dynamic but unpredictable common law.  To 
many legal academics at the time, this sudden burst of judicial activity suggested that common law 
itself would manage reforms on the frontiers of liability.  Why turn to unknown legislative 
solutions, when creative judges could promote steady incremental change? 
C 1970s: Environmentalism and other "crises" 
By 1970, in yet another twist, popular attention focused suddenly on broad matters of safety, 
public health, and accident prevention.  The "environmental decade" had arrived, stimulated by 
works like Rachel Carson's 1962 classic Silent Spring.21  While the old no-fault debate was 
preoccupied with fine-tuning the compensation process, federal lawmakers addressed a wide range 
of social risks that were only dimly understood.  In contrast to the pervasive incrementalism 
elsewhere in public policy, the new environmental agenda was creative and comprehensive.  Even 
after its legislative energy was expended, it retained the power to evoke both public idealism and 
mass anxiety.  Today it remains a potent but unpredictable source of challenges to "business as 
usual". 
Also in the early 1970s, alongside environmental control, Congress approved regulatory 
schemes for occupational health and safety (OSHA) and consumer product safety (CPSA).22  In this 
context, policymakers stumbled across new connections between injury prevention and the existing 
legal framework for compensation.  As the public sphere took on new roles in regulating safety in 
the workplace and marketplace, it seemed to some like a small step to develop a more coordinated 
response to the plight of parties already injured.  At this same moment, state workers' compensation 
schemes came under critical scrutiny.  In 1972 a national conference laid out an agenda for federal 
reform of workers' compensation systems if significant local changes were not forthcoming.23  
Additional statutes were considered during this period that would have federalised state automobile 
compensation systems, medical malpractice rules, and product liability lawsuits.  In the late 1970s 
environmentalists proposed a federal compensation scheme for victims of hazardous toxic waste.24 
  
21  These developments have been summarised at length in the literature. For a recent treatment, see Philip 
Shabecoff Earth Rising: American Environmentalism in the 21st Century (Island Press, Washington DC, 
2000). 
22  Occupational Safety and Health Act 84 Stat 1590 (1970); Consumer Product Safety Act 86 Stat 1207 
(1972). In 1966 Congress had passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 80 Stat 718 (1966). 
23  National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws Report to Congress (Government Printing 
Office, Washington DC, 1972). The Commission was mandated by OSHA as a compromise measure 
between defenders of State laws and advocates of federalised standards. 
24  These developments are covered at length in chapter 7 of my book, Richard Gaskins Environmental 
Accidents (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1989).  
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The timing of these developments is important to the no-fault story.  During the 1960s, the 
desultory no-fault debate remained narrowly focused on automobiles, reduced by lack of ambition 
for social equity, and eventually overtaken by judicial innovations in the areas of product liability 
and medical malpractice.  At the moment when Woodhouse and Ison were thinking more 
systematically about compensation, Americans remained cautious and technocratic.  In the 
following decade, however, as public concerns shifted to safety and prevention, the no-fault debate 
came back with a broader focus.  The New Zealand scheme gained its greatest relevance to 
American debates during the middle of the 1970s.  From such diverse standpoints as medical 
accidents, social security disability, and the social impact of technology, several American agencies 
sponsored formal studies of the New Zealand scheme.25  It was in early 1979, I recall, that Sir Owen 
Woodhouse met in Washington with President Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell.    
Additional pressure for reform came from the common law itself, as personal injury litigation 
opened up wider scrutiny of consumer products and health services.  By the mid-1970s the first of 
many insurance industry crises appeared, prompting manufacturers and physicians to petition state 
and federal authorities for legislative relief, aimed variously at common law and the insurance 
industry.26  The federal executive branch convened an Interagency Task Force to address the crisis 
over consumer products, exploring in greater depth the boundaries between common law and 
private insurance that had figured in earlier no-fault debates about automobile injuries.27  Thus by 
the period 1975-78, concrete problems in the American system might have pushed us to consider 
more comprehensive reforms of compensation and prevention policies. 
  
25  For medical accidents, see Arthur H Bernstein "'No-Fault' Compensation for Personal Injury in New 
Zealand" in United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Report of the Secretary's 
Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973) Supplementary Volume 848. For technology, see Jane C 
Kronick (ed) New Zealand Accident Compensation: Community Responsibility as a Value Response to 
Technological Development (National Science Foundation, 1978); Value Issues in the Control of 
Technology-Related Damage (National Science Foundation, 1980) [National Science Grants Nos 0SS76-
14797 and 0SS78-18023]. On disability, see the report of economist George Rohrlich (another Fulbright 
Scholar) on his 1980 visit to New Zealand: George Rohrlich "A Study of Comprehensive Compensation 
Approaches" submitted to the United States Department Health, Education and Welfare under Grant No 10-
P-98048-3-01 (1980). 
26  For discussion see chapter 3 of Gaskins, above. 
27  The Final Report of the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability was submitted in 1978 (Government 
Printing Office, Washington DC, 1978). In 1977 the same Task Force submitted a volume of Selected 
Papers and a Legal Study, among other documents. The Final Report is a highly political document, a large 
part of the drafting having been done by a committee headed by Victor E Schwartz, who became a leading 
industry lobbyist for federal product liability statutes. See, for example, Victor E Schwartz "Federal Action 
on Product Liablity—What Has Occurred and What May Occur" (1978) 14 Forum 287. In 1978 the 
Department of Commerce proposed a formal study of broad compensation systems, but it was never done. 
"Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Issues" (1978) 43 Federal Register 14612. 
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D Summary: Out with a Whimper 
At this point, then, why did the United States fail to pursue the New Zealand model, beyond 
funding a few exploratory studies?  Why did we not at least follow Australia and the United 
Kingdom in convening high-profile commissions to explore comprehensive reforms?  It was a 
singular moment of opportunity that would never return, given imminent changes in political 
ideology and academic thinking that settled in by 1980.  To anyone who lived through this period, 
the answer seems all-too-clear: compromise was simply not possible politically among the 
competing interests of lawyers, insurers, and claimants, not to mention the escalating conflicts 
between plaintiff and defendant groups in areas of product liability and medical malpractice.28  
Given the cumbersome legislative machinery in America, starting with our division of power 
between state and federal authorities, it was too easy for any single group to block accommodation.  
Groups that saw advantages to expanding litigation were unwilling to abandon the courts; while 
their adversaries thought they could limit judicial creativity by targeted legislation.  Although 
Congress passed new social programmes to provide national medical insurance for the elderly and a 
broader disability benefit, prospects for further strengthening the social safety net were dim.  Under 
all these political circumstances, Americans never managed to give the New Zealand model a 
serious public hearing.29 
That might well have been the final word in this historical survey of no-fault in America.  But 
the political constraints were only one phase of the overall drama.  In retrospect it is clear that 
important changes in academic theory were building throughout the same two decades when no-
fault policies struggled for definition.  These changes were pioneered by economists but began 
drifting over into political science and law during the 1960s.  Throughout the 1970s, the no-fault 
debate changed dramatically on the level of ideas, with the result that prior issues of compensation 
and prevention were translated into a new conceptual idiom.  The difference from earlier debates is 
truly breathtaking.  Along with reframing the central issues, American theorists offered strange and 
unfamiliar policy remedies, couched in the arcane vocabulary of welfare economics.  As these new 
concepts spread beyond America they eventually encountered comprehensive no-fault models. 
  
28  The research team chaired by Jane C Kronick, above, was asked by the National Science Foundation to 
address specifically the way New Zealand handled competing interest groups on matters of substance and 
process. American officials interested in the New Zealand model assumed that our interest groups were 
beyond compromise, especially in a strategic climate shaped by volatile common law developments. In this 
respect, not much has changed in the intervening decades.  For an update on political aspects of the no-fault 
debate see Thomas Burke Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
2002).  Burke points out that the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA), which was to become a 
major lobbying force to preserve litigation, opened its Washington office in 1972. 
29  When Marc A Franklin returned from a Fulbright visit to New Zealand, he tried to interest Americans in 
ACC reforms indirectly—not on the level of social philosophy but by emphasising common patterns in the 
incidence of personal injury: Marc A Franklin "Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United 
States: Some Striking Similarities" (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 653. 
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Within a few short years, the major questions that had driven the Woodhouse inquiry would fall out 
of favour, to be replaced by entirely new questions. 
Before pursuing this next phase of the story, let me take stock of where the historical evidence 
has brought us so far.  Real history is plotted differently from formula fiction. There are always too 
many reasons why events turned out as they did, especially with the hindsight of 25 years.  
Moreover every era reveals countervailing tensions, and the overriding role of fate remains opaque 
and impersonal in the events I am recounting.  My interpretation concludes that Americans never 
seriously engaged the New Zealand model of accident compensation reform, neither in the relatively 
passive 1960s nor the more volatile mid-1970s, when domestic debates might have found great 
relevance in ACC.  Except for occasional experts who had travelled to New Zealand, Americans 
never closely inspected the Woodhouse strategy during this period, and they did not know enough 
about it to reject it.  The combined effects of legislative inertia and interest-group politics narrowed 
the American debate to incremental adjustments of judicial rules and private insurance practices.  
Despite the countervailing energy of the environmental movement, Americans were losing 
confidence in the federal government following the Nixon scandals, bitter resistance to the Vietnam 
War, and the impact of global economic shocks.  Any possible window for major reform closed 
decisively in the late 1970s. 
In addition, throughout the 1970s the federal judiciary enjoyed exceptionally high regard among 
political progressives, following a decade of civil rights and civil libertarian reforms imposed by 
heroic judges.  As was noted, State courts had been energetically expanding liability rules after the 
mid-1960s, and many social liberals preferred to let judges guide any reform.30  In contrast to the 
critiques of common law found a decade earlier in Ison and Woodhouse, many American scholars 
welcomed the doctrinal activism of State judges.  They gradually lost interest in how judicial 
processes affected individual victims.31  
  
30  For a close study of the spread of product liability in a single state jurisdiction, see William Nelson The 
Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology in New York 1920-1980 (University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill, 2001). Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, a favorite phrase of progressive legal scholars 
was "law [meaning 'litigation'] as an instrument of social change". 
31  A defence of common law trends was released in 1984 by an American Bar Association "Special 
Committee" on the tort liability system: Special Committee of the American Bar Association Towards a 
Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law. 
Meanwhile little was written on the impact of tort processes on individual victims. After Donald R. Harris 
and his Oxford colleagues published a major empirical study on that topic in the United Kingdom (Donald 
R Harris Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984)), it took an 
additional seven years for the leading American research centre on tort law to publish a limited replication 
of Harris' study (Deborah R Hensler Compensation for Accidental Injuries in the United States (Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, 1991)). 
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II THE REVOLUTION IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 
It now seems plain that Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 marked an ideological shift to the right 
in America.  Proponents of "free" market policies moved quickly into the open spaces created by 
declining confidence in government.  For anyone who remembered Walter Heller's jibe at Milton 
Friedman, the joke was now on Heller and his Keynesian followers.  Indeed, even as Heller spoke, 
Friedman's team was replacing the old macroeconomics with the new orthodoxy of monetarism.  
Friedman himself had just completed his term as President of the American Economic Association 
in 1967.  By 1980 it was respectable to say to governments: "Don't do something, just stand there", 
when government itself was thought to be the source of social ills. 
But it is a mistake to approach this shift as purely a matter of ideology.  Just as America started 
tilting to the right, a new wave of academic theory was changing the old no-fault debate beyond 
recognition. These new analytical tools, taken over from welfare economics, captivated many 
compensation theorists on the left and centre-left of the political spectrum, as well as on the right.32  
The pioneers of this movement advanced their ideas in the name of objective science; but over time 
their disciples learned how to apply the new tools selectively for partisan advantage.  By 1980 
market advocates were skillfully exploiting the special affinity between welfare economics and 
market-based solutions to social problems.  They kept their opponents off balance by erecting strong 
theoretical presumptions against further expansion of compensation rules and safety regulations.  
Let me first describe how welfare economics changed the no-fault debate in America, and then 
connect these independent changes to the rightward lurch in American politics. 
Welfare economics colonised public policy debates in America during the 1960s for many 
reasons.  One major cause was the professional commitment to impartial scientific inquiry at 
leading universities.  Welfare economics brought nothing in the way of empirical data, but it offered 
its champions the mantle of objectivity at the level of formal theory.  At a time when political 
debates in America were fragmenting into interest-group polemics, social scientists embraced the 
idea of rigorous, value-free methods.33  A new generation of academics used these analytical tools 
to insulate their policy prescriptions from standard partisan attack.  Guido Calabresi was typical of 
  
32  The so-called "new" welfare economics goes back to the 1930s. See E J Mishan Welfare Economics: An 
Assessment (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969). The "older" welfare economics had been centrally 
concerned with distributional equity and the active role of government in combating externalities. 
33  See Theodore M Porter Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1995) ix. On the appeal of welfare economics to academic lawyers, see Morton 
J Horwitz "Law and Economics: Science or Politics?" (1980) 8 Hofstra Law Review 905. 
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his cohort in bemoaning the "woefully unsophisticated" analyses that "had seemed to support the 
trend toward nonfault liability", which therefore needed new microeconomic foundations.34 
Thanks to this academic revolution, the no-fault debate in America shifted onto a new 
theoretical plane and quickly changed beyond recognition.  Indeed, the change was so fundamental 
that most academics (whether on the left or the right) found themselves facing a new constellation 
of social problems and relevant data.  In my view, this is a rare example of a paradigm change in 
social science, where a new conceptual system displaced its predecessor by changing the very tools 
of analysis, and not by force of empirical evidence. 
A Efficiency for What Purpose? 
Let me illustrate this conceptual revolution with some examples.  Nowhere better to begin than 
with the term "efficiency", which assumes new meanings in welfare economics, different from its 
use in documents like the Woodhouse Report.  When the Woodhouse Commission described its 
comprehensive scheme as "efficient", its language reflected the political economy of an earlier era.  
Woodhouse efficiency referred to the social use of resources drawn from public and private spheres, 
and dedicated to a democratically defined purpose.  These resources were mainly levies or 
premiums charged to employers through workers' compensation insurance, and fees charged to 
drivers through motor vehicle insurance.  These same resources, said the Woodhouse Commission, 
could fund broader social objectives in a comprehensive scheme, provided the right to bring 
personal injury actions had been removed. The resources in question—already earmarked in 
existing insurance programs—came from individuals and firms but were directed to a larger public 
purpose.  The gain in "efficiency" relates to specific goals defined by the democratic process and 
embodied in legislation. 
By contrast, "efficiency" in the new welfare economics relates to goals generated by unregulated 
market systems—or, more precisely, goals derived from formal models of consumer sovereignty 
(and producer sovereignty).  People generally think of "efficiency" as a simple relationship of means 
to ends, but the ends themselves have to come from somewhere.35  The new welfare economics 
presumes that markets are the default source of such norms, and this presumption is built into the 
method itself.  It is not to be confused with an ideology of laissez-faire, although it is easy enough to 
see why many adherents to this method moved to the right on the political spectrum.36  Theorists 
  
34  Guido Calabresi The Costs of Accidents (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970) 5; see also his article 
Guido Calabresi "The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs" (1965) 78 
Harv L Rev 713. 
35  See the useful discussion in Aaron Wildavsky "The Political Economy of Efficiency" (1967) 8 The Public 
Interest 30. 
36  Two mainstream economists who tried to separate the ideology from the analytics were E J Mishan, see his 
collected essays in E J Mishan Economic Efficiency and Social Welfare (Allen & Unwin, London, 1981) 
and Amartya Sen On Ethics and Economics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1987). 
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with more progressive commitments accepted this presumption in favor of market goals, but were 
ready to supplement their case with special appeals to extrinsic norms.  Their methods were pure; 
their hearts were in the right place; but even the virtuoso performers must have experienced some 
cognitive dissonance.  If nothing else, they had to acknowledge the non-scientific, "subjective" 
status of normative appeals that reach beyond the market process.  The method itself is brutally 
clear: primary social goals flow from the logic of market models, although they do not logically rule 
out corrective goals engineered by politics.  This priority reverses the treatment of social goals in 
the Woodhouse Report and most other contemporary documents on no-fault. 
B Changing the Topic 
Along with displacing the very ends of social policy, the welfare economic approach to 
accidents produced even more fundamental changes.  When public policy takes its initial guidance 
from market signals, the core "problem" of personal injury changes by definition.  The problem-set 
emphasised by Woodhouse, Ison, and others was abandoned over the space of 10-15 years, and a 
new problem-set was put in its place.  Once upon a time, the personal injury "problem" was that of 
uncompensated harm befalling the victims of accidents, with associated social costs for dependents 
and society at large.  The remedy for this problem, following Woodhouse, was a public scheme that 
advanced accident prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation with coherence and equity. 
By contrast, thanks to the new conceptual models of welfare economics, the personal injury 
problem changed its name.  First and foremost, it became the peculiar problem of ensuring that 
society does not overcommit resources to the task of accident prevention.  This core problem 
logically dominates all others across the new literature, leaving no analytical room for issues of 
equity and fairness emphasised by Woodhouse.  In trying to solve this problem of conserving 
resources used for prevention, the pioneers of welfare economics redefine compensation and 
rehabilitation as consumer commodities, for which market demand (whether real or simulated) tells 
us, by default, how much is enough.  Given this radical change of emphasis, it is not surprising that 
proponents of welfare economics took little note of the Woodhouse Report.  Today's neo-liberal 
critics of ACC are able to cast broad suspicion on the scheme by simply restating their own central 
postulates.  In current debates, very little depends on concrete facts or evidence, and practically 
everything depends on how one defines the core social problem.  
Such criticisms of ACC began appearing in American writings around 198037 and could barely 
conceal their verdict that the whole framework was wrongheaded.  These judgments were imported 
  
37  James A Henderson, Jr "The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform" (1981) 48 U Chi L Rev 781. 
An earlier casual dismissal came in Jeffrey O'Connell Ending Insult to Injury: No-Fault Insurance for 
Products and Services (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1975) 73 (describes the New Zealand Act as a 
"blind alley"). Monroe Berkowitz used a Calabresian framework to criticise funding mechanisms in a 
lengthy empirical study:  The Economics of Work Accidents in New Zealand (Victoria University Industrial 
Relations Centre, Wellington, 1979). 
 THE FATE OF "NO-FAULT" IN AMERICA 227 
 
into the New Zealand debate in the late 1980s,38 where they eventually fostered the 1992 and 1998 
legislative reforms.  Given the timing, many people associate this critique with the neo-liberal shift 
in New Zealand politics.  Perhaps so; but there was something more than ideology behind the 
critique, just as there were broader cultural complaints behind the political shifts of the 1980s.  
Defenders of the Woodhouse philosophy were forced to contend with a new style of argument—one 
that was increasingly accepted as orthodoxy by many centrists as well as neo-liberals.  Echoing 
similar arguments heard in the United States, some opponents of ACC insisted that their conclusions 
were scientific rather than political.  Behind this claim was the notion that formal theory could 
guarantee objective results.  While vigorous disputes might remain about empirical evidence, the 
core debate turned on matters of definition. 
C The Calabresian Moment 
To review just when and how the compensation debate took this decisive turn toward welfare-
economic models, let me return to 1960s America and the respected works of Guido Calabresi—a 
friend and teacher of several participants in this conference, including me.  In a series of articles 
published during the 1960s, Calabresi set the stage for his systematic work The Costs of 
Accidents.39  Calabresi was the first (and perhaps the clearest) legal academic to apply welfare 
economics to accident policy.  Moreover his own progressive political commitments were (and 
remain) a matter of public record.  Before long, however, the movement launched by Calabresi was 
joined by fearless and articulate representatives of the Chicago School, and thereafter the mantle of 
objective science was vigorously contested by scholars holding adverse policy agendas.  Calabresi's 
personal views on social policy were similar to those of his progressive mentor Fleming James, Jr, 
and in some imagined history we might find Calabresi as the natural exponent of Woodhouse-style 
reforms in 1960s America.  But that is not what happened, as the logic of welfare economics sent 
Calabresi off on a different sort of quest. 
  
38  See New Zealand Business Roundtable Review of Accident Compensation  (submission to the New Zealand 
Law Commission 1987) as well as its publication New Zealand Business Roundtable Accident 
Compensation in New Zealand: A Proposal for Reform (New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington, 
1990). In 1988 a Fulbright-sponsored symposium examined "The Influence of United States Economics on 
New Zealand" (NZIER, Wellington, 1988). 
39  Guido Calabresi The Costs of Accidents (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970).  It is a matter of 
interpretation when Calabresi's approach took hold. In the legal academic world, his book and the 
subsequent debates with Posner and others were widely discussed by the mid-1970s, and achieved 
something like orthodoxy by 1980. Prior to 1970 Calabresi's ideas were available to specialists through 
journal articles, but I concur with Gary T Schwartz, "My impression … is that the scholarly community had 
regarded Calabresi's pre-Costs writings as a somewhat esoteric sideshow" (Gary T Schwartz "Foreword—
Torts Scholarship" [1985] 73 Cal L R 549). The leading commentator in Britain, Patrick S Atiyah, remained 
dubious through the third edition of his treatise, Patrick S Atiyah Accidents, Compensation and the Law 
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1980) although Atiyah himself seemed to undergo a conversion to 
market ideology in the early 1990s. The fifth edition edited by Peter Cane gives a respectful statement of 
general deterrence theory, but stresses its practical weaknesses (Butterworths, London, 1993). 
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At first glance, the most striking fact about The Costs of Accidents40 is that it never attempts to 
reckon what accidents really cost.  At no point does Calabresi provide any empirical evidence on the 
toll or distribution of accident costs—anywhere in the world.41  This striking absence underscores 
the contrast with the Woodhouse Report and Ison's Forensic Lottery,42 as well as practically all 
other contemporary studies of no-fault schemes.  The most attentive reader can reach the end of this 
lengthy tome with no idea how much accidents were costing either the victims or society as a whole.  
Of course, this was entirely intentional.  More than just changing the conversation, Calabresi 
changed the very language in which personal injury policies were being debated.  For him, the 
central question about "costs" had little to do with victims suffering losses, or with the social 
programs that would shoulder those burdens.  It had to do instead with certain algebraic ratios—
most important the ratio of aggregate costs of compensation and prevention in a unified market.  
The whole performance is an armchair exercise requiring no measurements, no empirical 
investigation, no personal interviews, no actuarial tables, and no attention to technology or 
innovation. 
Calabresi's book was brilliantly calculated to answer a single overarching question: when do we 
know that society is spending too much on accident prevention?43  He wanted an answer that was 
qualitative and not quantitative, algebraic and not arithmetical.  In the context of 1960s no-fault 
debates, the whole question of "optimal prevention" was a novel inquiry that no one else had 
thought to pursue (although it would soon be raised vigorously by defendant groups in product 
liability and medical malpractice cases).  Had the Woodhouse Commission even formulated this 
question, it might have said something like this: we need more prevention at the moment; and 
someday we may recognise when we have done enough, but only after we have done much more.  
That is not rigorous enough for Calabresi.  Additionally, his approach reduces the preferred 
mechanisms for prevention to economic incentives operating on choices made by individual actors.  
So powerful is this concept of prevention that it casts automatic suspicion on virtually all the 
strategies of prevention contemplated by Woodhouse, to the extent they deviate from the incentive 
pattern attributed to idealised markets. 
  
40  Calabresi, above. 
41  The absence of empirical data was mentioned in some early reviews. See Frank I Michelman "Pollution as a 
Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs" (1971) 80 Yale L J 647 and Richard Posner, who 
noted Calabresi's "weak sense of fact" and also the rare mention of court decisions "and, if I recall 
accurately, no statutes" in Richard Posner "Book Review: Guido Calabresi The Costs of Accidents: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis" (1970) 37 U Chi L Rev 636, 643. 
42  Terence G Ison The Forensic Lottery (Staples Press, London, 1967). 
43  I am aware that my paraphrase of Calabresi's argument uses broader language than what can be strictly 
formulated within the logic of optimisation theory. I am trying to show how Calabresi projected that theory 
into a broader rhetorical field—something that the theory itself cannot explain. 
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Even more curious than Calabresi's big question was his delphic answer: the costs of prevention 
should not exceed the costs of compensation.  This pulls the discussion even farther away from the 
standard 1960s debate, which was busily separating the social functions of compensation and 
prevention, assigning each function to separate institutions.  In addition, Calabresi's response begs 
an obvious further question: if we cap the collective investment in prevention at the limits of total 
compensation, how much total compensation should we provide?  This second-order question 
receives further oblique answers cast in Calabresi's formulaic style, including the advice that 
compensation levels should defer to the primary goal of "optimising" investment in prevention.  A 
third-order set of questions deals with potential state regulation of markets, whose very function is 
to dictate optimal outcomes.  These questions too must defer to the goal of optimising investment in 
prevention.  Taken together, these three levels of inquiry popularised a mode of analysis that was 
strikingly different from anything found in earlier no-fault debates. 
D "Internalisation" as a Fundamental Value 
For Woodhouse and Ison, the most serious defects of the prevailing compensation system were 
the numbers of uncompensated individual victims, as well as inequitably compensated victims as a 
class.  For Calabresi, by contrast, the most serious defect of any compensation system—present or 
future—is the failure to "internalise" accident costs to the parties that could avoid them most 
cheaply in the future.  For optimal prevention the overriding norm is rational cost accounting, and 
too much internalising is equally bad as too little.  How different this seems from the Woodhouse 
framework, which articulates a clear standard of social entitlement and builds its reforms on clear 
principles of fair distribution.  The Calabresi framework borrows its social norms from idealised 
markets, and seeks mainly to ensure that markets are spared the imperfections of externalised costs.  
This shift creates an entirely new playing field for commentators on accident compensation. 
Calabresi does not ignore questions of justice, but he painstakingly removes them to a small 
final section of his treatise.  When he finally steps outside the analytical model to address the topic 
of justice, his narrative discomfort is painfully obvious.  He acknowledges that nothing inside his 
model can replace the default norms of free markets and consumer sovereignty, which drive the 
mechanics of allocational efficiency.  Any substantive principle of fairness, accordingly, must be 
"externally" imported from non-scientific sources.  The objective analyst must regard the 
Woodhouse principles (or other principles of justice) as cultural artifacts—as "dat[a] to be dealt with 
like the climate".44 Here, then, is a major historical divide that separates the Woodhouse generation 
from the Calabresian moment.  The Woodhouse Report was keen to embrace substantive principles 
of justice; after Calabresi, all such norms have become political, subjective, irrational, external, and 
analytically severed from the theory of accidents. 
  
44  Guido Calabresi The Costs of Accidents (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970) 292. 
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Calabresi was not a market purist—far from it.  His book gives ample space to contemporary 
theories of market imperfections and, indeed, even suggests creative ways to correct them (always 
in line with what idealised markets would have said).  Within a short time, however, Richard Posner 
and his Chicago School colleagues joined the compensation debate, bringing along a normative 
perspective that located justice itself within market systems, whose alleged imperfections they 
sought to rationalise.  By the mid-1970s, this rarefied academic debate became polarised on the 
level of method.  These different uses of formal theory inserted themselves into partisan battles over 
liability, at a time when Americans were trying to cope with zealous courts, beseiged manufacturers 
and physicians, and gyrating liability insurance costs. 
E Back to Politics as Usual? 
Calabresi himself was not detached from the policy debates of his day.  From everything we 
know, his elegant theories of "optimality" were not what brought him into the compensation 
debate—far from it.  As a student of Fleming James, Calabresi wanted to advance a specific part of 
James's progressive agenda: to expand the judicial doctrine of strict liability in the emerging field of 
product liability.45  An interpretation of Calabresi's historical role requires us to speculate on how 
his formal inquiry contrived to support his political agenda.  Since Faustian imagery enters into his 
own book, let me suggest that Calabresi himself made a Faustian bargain with the new tools of 
welfare economics, which appeared magically on his doorstep as he began his academic career.  
Like many other social scientists of this decade, he explained his project as searching for 
theoretically secure microfoundations to ground his policy proposals.  If his favoured policies could 
be deduced as theorems from the overarching logic of welfare economics, it follows, he could trump 
his political opponents with scientific, objective prescriptions.46 
The movement to strict liability for manufacturers was already expanding through the decisions 
of State court judges, and it was strengthened in 1965 when the prestigious American Law Institute 
endorsed §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  This trend was championed by socially 
progressive commentators of the 1950s and 1960s, to whom its utilitarian benefits seemed too 
obvious to need much backing.  In contrast to the distributively neutral problem of automobile 
injuries, this contest between consumers and producers recalled something of the older class conflict 
in workers' compensation.  James's pioneering essays, among others, tried to supplement the trend 
toward strict liability with a set of economic arguments.  When it came to designing safer products, 
ensuring quality control, and promoting consumer education, according to James, it was often most 
  
45  For an excellent assessment of James' work, see Patrick S Atiyah "American Tort Law in Crisis" (1987) 7 J 
Legal Stud 279-301. The background to James is thoroughly explored in G Edward White Tort Law in 
America: An Intellectual History (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985). 
46  Most notably he criticised Blum and Kalven's defence of the tort system for failing to show that tort 
achieves "optimal" results. Guido Calabresi "Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and 
Kalven" (1965) 75 Yale L J 238. 
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"efficient" for the manufacturer to take the initiative.  In an age of private insurance, where the 
moral stigma of tort law had been attenuated, strict liability was a modern tool for imposing the 
initiative for safety where it most belonged—not for moral reasons, but for economic ones.  To 
progressive liberals like James, who were skeptical of the caveat emptor ideology of free markets,47 
it seemed obvious that manufacturers had excessive power to dictate terms to consumers.  
Consumers thus deserved the protection of strict liability rules. 
Calabresi's work supplied the "microfoundations" for this Jamesian policy, supporting it with an 
elegant theoretical structure, and building his case on logic rather than empirical evidence.  
Calabresi made the case for strict liability rules (imposed by whom was not at all clear), but 
sidestepped the distributive arguments that were prominent in James's work.  It all rested on the 
neutral values of cost efficiency: manufacturers were generally in a better position to reduce the 
costs of accidents (they were arguably the "cheapest cost-avoiders").  To be clear about it: the goal 
was not mere prevention.  The sophisticated theorist called instead for "optimal prevention", which 
meant capping the investment in prevention at the level of compensation payments.  For the sake of 
optimal prevention, the price of compensation must be brought home to the manufacturer-
defendants who are in the best position to avoid future injuries.  Similarly, before these 
manufacturer-defendants can impute correct prices for compensation costs, the legal system (or 
someone) must channel all worthy plaintiffs to precisely those defendants whose actions "caused" 
the underlying (and presumably on-going) damage.  The policy recommendations turn out to be the 
same strict liability policies favoured by James and others, but the rationale is different.  Instead of 
promoting fairness in distribution, the strict liability regime promotes efficient allocation of 
resources in pursuit of optimal prevention.  Not too much prevention, but also not too little—just the 
right or "optimal" amount.   
Calabresi's Faustian bargain comes down to this.  For the sake of an earthly principle (strict 
liability to the manufacturer) he invested in the conceptual revolution that would ultimately 
undermine his "non-scientific" policy preferences.  In order to make strict liability the 
recommendation of a neutral economic calculus, Calabresi had to embrace the broader principle that 
accident prevention costs should be capped at the limits of compensation.48  Reading between the 
lines, he was willing to accept this central premise, if it allowed him to deduce strict liability to 
manufacturers as a neutral corollary.  All he really needed to make this deduction work was the 
  
47  Compare James Buchanan "In Defense of Caveat Emptor" (1970) 38 U Chi L Rev 74. Buchanan 
supplements his economic arguments with a theory of justice derived from consent of sovereign individuals. 
His disciples try to resolve questions of legitimacy by reference to putative (or sometimes actual) contracts, 
constitutional pacts, and other artifices of consent. As philosophy Buchanan's approach satisfies many who 
share his libertarian values, including many in New Zealand.  
48  Patrick Atiyah noted the "irony" that James's progeny would embrace market models, when the Jamesian 
approach was so clearly based on skepticism toward markets. Patrick S Atiyah "American Tort Law in 
Crisis" (1987) 7 J Legal Stud 301 sees this irony as "the source of the crisis of modern American tort law". 
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concept of cost internalisation, borrowed from standard welfare-economic theory.  The "decision for 
accidents" can go on automatic pilot, according to this notion, so long as the costs of compensation 
are imposed on those who typically control investments in prevention.  The Calabresian theorist 
never leaves this abstract world of algebraic relations.  Having set qualitative limits to prevention by 
restricting it to the sum of any and all compensation, Calabresi hurries past the vexing question of 
what should be the proper level of compensation.  Calabresi does not locate this question within his 
formal scheme, although his Chicago School adversaries certainly would; and political opponents of 
strict liability were ready to propagate the new Chicago wisdom. 
F Theory Tilts to the Right 
Following the ingenious contributions of Richard Posner and Richard Epstein,49 high-level tort 
theory exploded in the academic literature.  Posner's journals promoted extensive analytical studies 
for the remainder of the decade, and beyond.  The parallel work of Ronald Coase and members of 
the Virginia School provided a fund of theorems rich enough to sustain a permanent, specialised 
literature.50  In addition, largely in response to the aggressive utilitarianism of welfare economics, 
other tort scholars sought equally radical foundations in neo-Kantian moral theory.51  By 1980 this 
new literature of "corrective justice" did far more than to "correct" the shadowy treatment of justice 
in the welfare economics literature: it built an entire normative defence of tort law around notions of 
individual desert and interpersonal reciprocity (not to say retribution).  The earlier debate over "no-
fault" remained lost beyond all recognition in these scholastic battles.52  A few writers tried to 
recapture the comprehensive reform spirit of the Woodhouse era, but were politely ignored 
  
49  The opening shots were fired in Richard Posner "A Theory of Negligence" (1972) 1 J Legal Stud 29 and 
Richard Epstein "A Theory of Strict Liability" (1973) 2 J Legal Stud 151. On the Posner phenomenon, see 
Cento G Veljanovski "Wealth Maximization, Law and Ethics—On the Limitations of Economic Efficiency" 
(1981) 1 Int'l Rev of Law and Economics 5. 
50  The Coase article is one of the century's most frequently cited articles: Ronald Coase "The Problem of 
Social Cost" (1960) 3 J of Law and Economics 1. Members of the Virginia School include James M 
Buchanan. His 1965 book with Gordon Tullock, James M Buchanan and Gordon Tullock The Calculus of 
Consent (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1965) was influential in transfering welfare-economic 
methods into political science and law. See also his volume edited with Robert D Tollison, James M 
Buchanan and Robert D Tollison Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics (University 
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1972). 
51  Izhak Englard provides a critique of the first years of this movement: Izhak Englard The Philosophy of Tort 
Law (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1992) chap 2.  Equally insightful is his review of American tort theorists in the 
late 1970s: Izhak Englard "The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory" 
(1980) 9 J Legal Stud 68. 
52  By 1987 Patrick S Atiyah was ready to concede that "American tort law has become one big mess" (Patrick 
S Atiyah "American Tort Law in Crisis" (1987) 7 J Legal Stud 300). 
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(including my own work on American policy in 1989).  Others took on the Herculean task of 
applying empirical evidence to the abstractions of high theory, with mixed results.53 
Over time welfare economics drifted steadily rightwards—although it remains a matter of 
interpretation whether this was the cause or effect of the neo-liberal turn in American politics.  
Reformers with a progressive social agenda faced a dilemma.  By the late 1970s, academic 
conventions had accepted welfare-economic theory (and its implied market norms) as a neutral 
method of inquiry—if not the only such method.  To be sure, other schools soon emerged in 
competition, including some that attacked the entire discipline of neo-classical economics.54  Some 
new way forward needed to be found, but it proved difficult to escape the straitjacket of conceptual 
frameworks.  The partisan struggles Calabresi wanted to avoid were reasserting themselves, 
exploiting tacit norms embedded in abstract theory. 
In an age of eroding confidence in government, welfare economics naturally fills the normative 
vacuum vacated by politics.  Calabresi's elegantly structured theory provides a roadmap for this 
rightward journey, tracing a route Calabresi himself strenuously resisted.  His argument was spread 
across three separate planes, each of which carries a presumptive (but not conclusive) commitment 
to market solutions.  On the first and most fundamental level, as explained above, Calabresi locates 
his master cost ratios of prevention and compensation.  At this level, Calabresi wants the "decision 
for accidents" to emerge spontaneously from the market decisions of actors who stand ready to 
prevent only those accidents for which avoidance costs are cheaper than compensation.  This 
theorem is revolutionary enough, compared to the no-fault arguments that preceded it, but Calabresi 
knows that it begs further questions. 
In particular, it begs a second level of inquiry about the proper sum of compensation, on which 
economic actors base their individual decisions about accidents.  Along with everybody else, 
Calabresi wants the costs of compensation to be "internalised"—or visited upon those actors who 
can prevent future accidents most cheaply.  But he does not tell us exactly what these compensation 
benefits should be, whoever ends up paying the bill.  In prior no-fault debates, some plans wanted 
benefits scaled to minimal levels of social security, while others wanted to replicate the categories 
of common law damages.  But welfare economics prefers an answer generated by markets—
assuming we can imagine a consumers' market where individuals bargain (in advance) for insurance 
against particular hazards and at particular levels of their own sovereign choice.  Calabresi uses 
  
53  See Stephen D Sugarman "Doing Away with Tort Law" (1985) 73 Cal L Rev 555; Richard Gaskins 
Environmental Accidents (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1989). Several empirical studies grew out 
of a massive, multi-year project sponsored by the American Law Institute and others. For summaries see 
Don Dewees Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts Seriously (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1996). 
54  Among these schools was Critical Legal Studies. See Allan C Hutchinson "Beyond No-Fault" (1985) 73 Cal 
L Rev 755. 
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sociological and psychological literature to raise doubts about entrusting this choice to market 
models.  One wonders, though, why Calabresi trusts these hypothetical markets any less than that 
larger marketplace where rational calculators "choose" whether to cause or prevent future accidents.  
In partly removing the "choice for compensation" from markets, Calabresi may not have met the 
high burden of proof imposed by his own model—and so he was told by Posner and others.55  In 
classic Chicago style, Posner posited pure insurance markets dominated by consumer choice, and he 
concluded that Calabresi's approach would most likely overcompensate people.  Overcompensation 
commits the sin of cost "externalisation" and would thus corrupt the higher-level calculus of optimal 
prevention.  Critics like Posner did not have to prove that Calabresi was wrong—only that his non-
market solutions failed to meet the burden of proof stacked against him by his own model.  No 
empirical evidence can decide this question in concrete cases; it is rather a matter of each theorist's 
confidence in hypothetical market norms. 
As formal economics advanced new theorems to suggest the impotence of government policy 
during the 1980s, Calabresi's burden grew even larger.  Throughout his writings he argued 
consistently for at least some State interventions in market systems, as part of a third layer of 
analysis.  Sometimes he based his argument on subjective notions of justice, but at other times he 
wanted to bolster the integrity of markets themselves.  Whether he was right or wrong, Calabresi 
and his supporters had to make a case for some "optimal" level of market regulation.  It is an 
argument that cannot be decided by empirical data, and all the presumptions of welfare economics 
and consumer sovereignty push against it. 
III  THE FUTURE OF NO-FAULT: LESSONS FROM THE PAST 
Every generation needs to find its own vision for accident compensation and prevention, based 
on its own definition of "accidents."  In moving forward, it helps to look back at our inherited 
assumptions, which are still firmly embedded in current policies and debates.  The fate of no-fault in 
America was sealed by 1980—the moment when welfare-economics changed the whole tone and 
substance of prior debate, using an analytical framework that seemed innovative in the 1960s.  The 
issue today is not whether we should use welfare-economic tools, which are obviously here to stay, 
but whether this framework can also provide the broader social principles for future policy.  As we 
look ahead to the new century, it may be time for a different vision. 
Much has changed in the world since the 1960s—in politics and the economy, as well as in 
society and technology.  For all its success in creating new wealth and technology, the developed 
world remains a perilous place.  Where once we measured that peril according to a table of maims, 
now the risk to personal well-being is much more diffuse.  Such risk still includes disabling injuries, 
  
55  As Morton J Horwitz wrote, liberals like Calabresi "were forced to treat tort law as a high transaction cost 
exception to a contract paradigm which claimed to best reflect the principle of consumer choice": "Law and 
Economics: Science or Politics?" (1980) 8 Hofstra L Rev 905, 908. 
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but now it encompasses a wider, more complex range of causes and agents than was commonly 
imagined four decades ago.  The difference goes beyond the chronic stresses and strains of the 
modern workplace, and includes the long-term health consequences of modern industrial systems, 
changing socio-economic structures, and our altered natural environment.  Today the very notion of 
"risk" points beyond the injuries themselves to multiple, overlapping risk factors in the areas of 
health, environment, income, family structure, community strength.56  As we learn more about 
injuries in relation to these diverse factors, we also learn how much remains unknown.  It seems to 
me we cannot rely on any policy framework that assumes we have already found (or could 
somehow engineer) a perfect balance between risk and response, agent and consequence, singular 
cause and containable effect.   
In my view, the persistence of welfare-economic models over the past twenty years or more has 
postponed the discovery of new social responses to risk.  That delay was not some evil conspiracy, 
but simply reflects the historic retreat of the state from its prior stewardship of social relations and 
social justice.  In the field of accidents, political institutions were overmatched in addressing 
complex risk factors that were already evident by the 1950s, even as Americans were gearing up for 
our pedestrian debates about "no-fault".  As the environmental movement surmised in the 1960s, 
continual advances in scientific knowledge have expanded the frontiers of uncertainty, presenting us 
with a host of ill-defined risk factors at the margins of progress.  It may well turn out that modern 
inequality derives more from the distribution of risk than from the distribution of wealth or income.  
Of course the whole calculus of distribution vanished from the American political agenda back in 
the 1970s.  Both then and now, our desire to respond to such challenges exceeds the capacities of 
our political and ethical systems.  The retreat into welfare economics in the 1970s seems like a 
rearguard effort to avoid renegotiating social responsibilities.  If that is indeed what happened, we 
need to look for some new framework. 
Instead of the tunnel vision of welfare economics, we need to broaden our understanding of the 
accident problem, putting the victims' losses (and all the other social costs of accidents) back into 
the public equation.  We also need to enlist all our social institutions in finding new solutions—
states as well as markets, principles of justice as well as principles of efficiency.  A broader vision 
changes the emphasis from traditional categories of accidents that focus too narrowly on single 
causes—workplace accidents, automobile accidents, defective products, and all the rest.  This shift 
is necessary not only for finding new approaches to compensation and financing, but also for 
accident prevention.  Economics remains vital to any public response, but we need new models to 
meet the conditions of a dynamic world.  We need economic models that leave behind the static 
analysis of the 1950s and embrace the more ragged capitalism of "creative destruction".  Within 
  
56  On these issues see Martin Carnoy Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family, and Community in the 
Information Age (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000); Niklas Luhmann Risk—A Sociological 
Theory (DeGruyter, New York, 1993). 
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academic economics, some theorists are replacing the model of self-executing markets with the 
organic relations of network capitalism.57  Additional work includes reclaiming the concept of 
social cost from the dominant influence of Ronald Coase.  In addition to measuring the empirical 
toll of personal injury on victims and society, we need better estimates of losses that fall outside the 
market calculus altogether.  A suitable replacement for Coase has long been available in the model 
of social cost developed by economist K William Kapp.  Influenced by European and American 
institutionalism, Kapp rejected the notion that social costs can be reduced to implied market choices, 
occasioned by Coase's postulated "transaction costs."  According to Kapp, social costs must be 
defined by the same social authority that sets the legal framework for market exchange.  
Acknowledging Kapp in a 1961 article, Calabresi conceded that Kapp's treatment of social costs 
was correct "in theory".  But he declined to follow it, based on the curious (and circular) argument 
that Kapp's social costs were too costly to calculate.58 
For principles of equity, responsibility, and even efficiency, Americans should consider 
revisiting the Woodhouse Report as a fresh source of innovative thinking.  In contrast to the 
contemporary American debate, the Woodhouse Commission was trying to find a new policy 
framework.  It was comprehensive in several ways that American contributions never were.  For 
example, it brought multiple social objectives into the mix—including the functions of social 
welfare.  It obviously looked beyond traditional causal categories to define injury in a broader 
fashion, even though, in practice, ACC retained those categories for reasons of financing the 
scheme.  Most important, it preserved for democratic governance the authority to provide definition 
and balance to the scheme.  Whether democratic government in New Zealand, over time, was equal 
to that challenge needs to be more clearly understood.  If not, we can hardly accuse New Zealand of 
political weakness greater than what was seen elsewhere in the world. 
Even if we start fresh with the Woodhouse Report, the question remains where we go from 
there.  Thirty-five years later, the search for a new vision is likely to move in different directions.  
Most important, in my opinion, is to find some broader social response to problems of prevention, 
including both health and safety.  To be sure, the Woodhouse Commission listed prevention as its 
highest priority.  But the Commission's views on complex causation must have made it difficult to 
imagine bold or comprehensive strategies for prevention, in contrast to the area of compensation.  
  
57  See Dirk Messner The Network Society: Economic Development and International Competitiveness as 
Problems of Social Governance (Frank Cass, London, 1997); J Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer 
(eds) Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997). 
58  For an introduction to Kapp, see K William Kapp "On the Nature and Significance of Social Costs" (1969) 
22 Kyklos 334. For a summary of Kapp's career, see Regine Heidenreich "Economics and Institutions: The 
Socioeconomic Approach of K William Kapp" (1998) 32 J of Economic Issues 965. For Calabresi on Kapp, 
see Guido Calabresi "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts" (1961) 70 Yale L J 499, 
532-33.  
 THE FATE OF "NO-FAULT" IN AMERICA 237 
 
The definition of injury was still relatively simple back in 1967, even if the mechanisms for 
prevention were not.59  Today we know much more about prevention in complex fields of multiple 
causation, multiple agents and organisations, and multiple points of leverage for distributing risk.  
The welfare-economic reduction of prevention to economic incentives was a delusion—not because 
incentives are unimportant, but because they are never sufficient in a world outside of perfect 
markets.  Starting also in the 1960s, epidemiologists and organisational theorists began developing a 
useful commentary on accident prevention, including both theory and empirical studies.60  Today 
there is a rich literature on these topics, best known within the Scandinavian countries, that could 
provide a new anchor for public policy in America. 
The next great innovation for accident policies will be a vision for accident prevention that is as 
bold as Woodhouse's vision for compensation.  It will deal comprehensively with issues of risk and 
responsibility in the complex environments of the twenty-first century.  It will draw heavily on 
economics, but will not use economics reductively to finesse questions of politics and public values.  
There is no good reason why this search should not begin soon in the United States, where the 
problems of tort law, insurance coverage, administrative efficiency, and equity are no closer to 
solution than they were in 1965.  But that search will more likely start elsewhere, and so why not—
once again—New Zealand?  The prerequisite is a fine understanding of ACC and its historical 
evolution.  But the future will require important changes in ends and means, including closer 
alliance with other fields of public policy that are also coming to terms with problems of risk and 
responsibility. 
  
59  William Vosburgh has suggested why it was easier to implement the compensation side of ACC than 
prevention, William Vosburgh "Primary Prevention, Priorities, and Implementation: The Case of the New 
Zealand Accident Compensation Act" in Felice D Perlmutter (ed) New Directions for Mental Health 
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Public Health 504; William Haddon Jr "Advances in the Epidemiology of Injuries as a Basis for Public 
Policy" (1980) 95 Public Health Reports 418. 
238 (2003) 34 VUWLR 
 
